SI: The Danger of Overworking Young Pitchers

[NJReds]

Interesting article, especially considering how the Reds are grooming Bailey and to a lesser extent, Wood.

Follies of youth
Tom Verducci, SI.com

The 2006 season might be remembered as the coming of a new age of young pitchers. Nine pitchers received rookie of the year votes, including AL winner Justin Verlander, the first rookie starting pitcher to win the award in that league in a quarter of a century. Anibal Sanchez of Florida threw the first no-hitter in the majors in more than two years. Jered Weaver joined Whitey Ford as the only pitchers to begin their careers 9-0.

Get ready for the down side to all that young pitching success. It's called the 2007 season. More specifically, it's the Year-After Effect (YAE), the price teams almost always pay for pushing their young pitchers too far. And we could be due for a huge crash next season.

I've been tracking the YAE for about a decade now. It's based on a general rule of thumb among executives and pitching coaches: young pitchers should not have their innings workload increased by more than 25 or 30 innings per year. It's the same principle as training for a marathon; you get to 26.1 miles incrementally, not by jumping directly from a 10K. The body cannot easily withstand being pushed so far behind its previous capacity for work, at least not without consequences. Typically, those consequences occur the next season, not the year in which the body is pushed.

When I've looked at major league pitchers 25-and-younger who were pushed 30 or more innings beyond their previous season (or, in cases such as injury-shortened years, their previous pro high), I've been amazed how often those pitchers broke down with a serious injury the next season or took a major step backward in their development. (The season total includes all innings in the minors, majors and postseason. )

For example, let's look at the YAE for the Class of 2005, the young pitchers who were pushed beyond the 30-inning threshold that season: Matt Cain (+33.1 innings at age 20), Francisco Liriano (+34.2 at 21), Gustavo Chacin (+35.2 at 24), Zach Duke (+44.1 at 22), Scott Kazmir (+51.2 at 21) and Paul Maholm (+98.1 at 23). Liriano (elbow), Chacin (elbow) and Kazmir (shoulder) all suffered significant injuries. Cain (+1.82), Duke (+2.66) and Maholm (+2.58) all saw dramatic rises in their ERAs.

The bottom line: a dramatic increase in innings on a young pitcher elevates the risk of injury or a setback to their development. This has been true for years. The Kansas City Royals were negligent with young pitchers for years, pushing young arms such as Chad Durbin (+49 in 2001), Runelvys Hernandez (+92 in 2002) and Zack Greinke (+33.2 in 2004). Even breakout young stars took a step back because of the YAE, such as Kevin Millwood (+78.1 in 1999), Dontrelle Willis (+52 in 2003), Horatio Ramirez (+34 in 2003) and Mark Prior (+67 in 2003).

Like any rule of thumb, there are exceptions, especially for big-bodied pitchers. C.C. Sabathia (+40 in 2001) and Carlos Zambrano (+72.1 in 2003) proved the YAE is not one-size-fits-all.

Now the bad news for the Class of 2006. I can't remember more young pitchers getting pushed this hard in all the years I've been tracking the YAE. I found 11 pitchers 25-and-under who went more than 30 innings beyond their 2005 log, or (where marked with an asterisk) their previous professional high. Here are the pitchers at high risk for a breakdown or regression in 2007:

In addition, I believe two others, who are just outside the age range, may be at risk, just as 27-year-old Brandon Backe (+43.2 in 2005, elbow breakdown in 2006) was this season.

If teams know they are putting pitchers at risk, why are they pushing them? The competition. It's difficult to manage a pitcher's innings by moving him to the bench or the bullpen when a team is trying to win games and there are no outward signs of wear and tear. The Tigers, for instance, did give Verlander two nine-day breaks, but they rode their ace all the way to the World Series. What else could they have done?

Likewise, the Marlins pushed Olsen and Sanchez because they still had a shot at the wild card in mid-September, though you could quibble with Florida allowing Olsen to throw 101 pitches on the meaningless penultimate day of the season. Likewise, the non-competitive Cubs had little to gain by continuing to run Hill and Marshall out to the mound. Hill pitched well in September (1.93 ERA), though his pitch counts do seem unnecessarily high: 106, 111, 120, 118, 99 and 115. Marshall struggled in September (8.34 ERA).

The Tigers, Marlins and Phillies are particularly vulnerable next season because they each landed two pitchers on the at-risk list. The tendency is to believe that players develop in a linear manner, that a year of experience virtually guarantees improvement. The Angels, for instance, might be thinking, "Oh, great! We've got Jered Weaver for a whole season this year!" Well, the Pirates might have thought the same about Duke and Maholm.

Such thinking is particularly dangerous with pitchers because of the greater health risk when compared to position players. Young position players can play all they want, take as many swings as they want, and generally don't put themselves at a much greater risk of injury or setback the way pitchers do if they increase their workload.

The next great test of the YAE could be Yankees prospect Phillip Hughes, generally considered the top pitching prospect in the minors. The Yankees have been saying that Hughes will come to spring training to compete for the fifth spot in the rotation. Baloney. The guy is only 20 and threw only 146 innings last season, when New York kept him on strict pitch counts. Why would the Yankees break camp with him in the rotation when there's no way he should be throwing more than 175 innings next year (postseason included), not to mention starting his arbitration clock?

New York likely will treat Hughes the way Boston did Jon Lester at the start of last season: send him to the minors and keep a tight lid on his innings there, with an in-season callup in mind. Better to have a plan in place to manage innings than to turn a pitcher loose and worry about it later.

Consider the expert care Seattle has given Felix Hernandez. The Mariners increased his innings by 23 at age 19 in 2005 and by 18.2 in 2006. He should be in fine shape for a breakout year in 2007, with less concern about having to manage his innings. Of course, the Mariners' plan was easy to execute for one simple reason: they never were very close to the postseason in those years.

[redsmetz]

So Bailey pitched about 35 more innings this season compared to his 2005 season with Dayton (138.2 to 103.2). I think the caution has been appropriate, fans protestations notwithstanding.

[redsfan4445]

so i wish someone would explain how pitchers in the early days could pitch 20-25 complete games a season!! not counting Spring training, post season and I bet they would laugh at this today!!

so much babying.. i think its indvidual preperation that is part of the problem.. but who knows

[NJReds]

so i wish someone would explain how pitchers in the early days could pitch 20-25 complete games a season!! not counting Spring training, post season and I bet they would laugh at this today!!

so much babying.. i think its indvidual preperation that is part of the problem.. but who knows

Could it have something to do with the amount of pitches kids are throwing at a very young age? I mean, in the 'early days' I don't think these kids were on traveling teams throwning curveballs at age 8.

[M2]

so i wish someone would explain how pitchers in the early days could pitch 20-25 complete games a season!! not counting Spring training, post season and I bet they would laugh at this today!!

so much babying.. i think its indvidual preperation that is part of the problem.. but who knows

Pitcher IP rise and fall with the quality of the offenses against which they pitch.

If all you've got to do is get through a Deadball Era lineup or some Judy assortment from the 60s or 70s then you can afford to cruise a little bit.

If you want to pitch against the sorts of mashers the game produced in the 30s and in the modern era, then you've got to be perfect on almost every pitch. You wear down quicker and when you do you're likely to find that your B game isn't going to cut it. You see it all the time in these days. A guy loses a shade when it comes to location and hitters foul off his would-be out pitches until they get a pitch they can handle (or draw a walk). The classic case is Pedro Martinez in Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS. He still had his velocity and movement, but he was missing location by a few inches and the Yankees singled him to death.

As for young pitchers blowing up, that's nothing new and it happened plenty in baseball's days of yore as well. Phenoms whose arms blow off have been a constant throughout baseball history.

Noodles Hahn, as good a pitcher as has ever taken the mound for the Reds, had his arm going to pieces shortly after his 26th birthday. Pete Schneider was toast before his 23rd birthday. Pete Donohoe was never the same after age 25. And those are guys who made it to the bigs and had some good to great years.

[Cyclone792]

so i wish someone would explain how pitchers in the early days could pitch 20-25 complete games a season!! not counting Spring training, post season and I bet they would laugh at this today!!

so much babying.. i think its indvidual preperation that is part of the problem.. but who knows

In 1963, Sandy Koufax went 25-5 in 40 starts with a 1.88 ERA in 311 innings (161 ERA+) and completed 20 of those games started.

How'd he pitch so many innings?

First, figure out how many innings pitched per start, which turns out to be 7.775, or just over 7.2 innings. Next, we know that Koufax averaged only 104 pitches thrown per start, which means that per inning Koufax only averaged 13.38 pitches per inning.

That 13.38 pitches per inning figure is crucial, because you'll rarely find that nowadays. In 2006, Greg Maddux threw 13.34 pitches per inning, and after him you have to go all the way down to Roy Halladay at 13.85 pitches per inning to find another starter even in the same neighborhood. BTW, Bronson Arroyo and Aaron Harang each averaged 16 pitches per inning.

In the old days when pitchers made more starts, completed more games, and threw more innings, they were averaging far fewer pitches per inning as the quality of offense was much lower than it is now. Hitters take more pitches in today's game than they did four decades ago. They also take more walks, and generally hitters who take more walks take more pitches. In 1963, for example, the league average BB/9 was 2.97. In 2004, the league average BB/9 mark jumped to 3.36.

Pitches per inning is a crucial factor for evaluating a pitcher's workload. If a pitcher keeps his pitches per inning total low each inning, he's able to pitch more innings and more total pitches per game without risking too much damage to his arm. When the pitches per inning total goes up, the overall pitch count has to be kept lower each game to help avoid injury, and the overall result is less innings thrown altogether over the course of a game and season. As another side-effect, complete games are rendered virtually extinct.

[RANDY IN INDY]

I think hitters take more walks because of the ridiculously small strike zones that most of today's umpires possess. If the strike zone was called the way it was intended, there would be fewer hitters with bats on their shoulders.

[westofyou]

Pitcher IP rise and fall with the quality of the offenses against which they pitch.

Example

1900-1920 one complete game every 2.1 games
1900-1920 one run every 8.3 AB's

1921-1940 one complete game every 4 games
1921-1940 one run every 7 AB's

[Cyclone792]

A snippet from a Bill James interview with Rich Lederer:

http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2005/03/breakfast_with_1.php

RL: You mention that year the debate over four-man and five-man pitching rotations. Do you think we will ever go back to the four-man rotation?

BJ: Between 1973 and 1984, baseball made two important steps back. In the early '70s, the workloads of pitchers were at historic high-water marks. They were higher than they had been since the Dead Ball era. Within ten years after that, we switched from a four-man to a five-man rotation and also began to limit pitchers in how many pitches they throw in a game and began to use more and more relievers earlier in the game.

In spite of these changes, it is difficult or impossible to establish that injury rates for pitchers have dropped. It seems to me that the desire to avoid injuring pitchers is certainly good and we should do whatever we can to avoid injuring pitchers. But it seems to be clear that one of those adjustments was appropriate and one was overkill. It's difficult to explain how you can make two changes designed to reduce injury rates to pitchers without reducing injury rates to pitchers! I think there is better evidence for the pitch limits than there is for the five-man rotation and, therefore, I think it's reasonably likely that at some point in the future we will go back to the four-man rotation.

RL: In the old days, pitchers like Christy Mathewson would throw harder to certain batters than to others. The fact that we have DHs now and second basemen who can hit, does that have an effect on the quality of each pitch?

BJ: Yes. When I wrote about that, I wasn't aware of that transition in history until I was working on the Historical Abstract -- and I wrote about that in '83 or '84. When I wrote about that, I thought it was over. I thought that was a transition that happened in history but what I didn't realize, particularly in the '90s, was this transition was still ongoing. One of the great differences between the '70s and now is that now you have a lot of guys who throw 86 as starters who can throw 90 as relievers for one inning and who do that. So, the starters push themselves harder, are out of the game earlier, and then you see a series of relievers who are throwing harder. So yes, it does affect the quality of the pitch but it's an open question -- a fair question -- whether by making this transition we've lost this, sort of, "pitchtility."

The Orioles in the '70s were extremely successful with a bunch of pitchers who probably threw 82-85 ninety percent of the time. Mike Flanagan, Scott McGregor, and Steve Stone weren't hard throwers but they could pitch 250 innings by saving their best stuff and pacing themselves. People don't pitch that way anymore, and it's not clear that you couldn't pitch that way anymore. It's fairly likely you could.

A few years ago we had a lead-off man, Brady Anderson, who hit 52 homers. In the '70s the idea of a lead-off man hitting 30 home runs was preposterous. Now it's as common as dirt. So that's a real transition, that you have to worry about the home run on every pitch. A lot of people because of that are reluctant to throw that 82 mile-an-hour screwball or cutter or something because they're afraid they're going to be changing the scoreboard with just one bad pitch.

[IslandRed]

There are never any guarantees with pitchers' arms, but a team can try to not be stupid. In the old days when every kid in America played baseball and there were fewer teams and there was no draft and the minor leagues were less structured, a team could use Darwinism as a development philosophy. Nowadays, you can't just go get another batch of good arms at will after destroying the ones you have, so it makes sense to do everything in your power to deliver pitchers to the big leagues in one piece.

[Cyclone792]

Strikeouts are also way up, and generally, though not always, hitters who strike out often see more pitches than hitters who do not strike out often. Likewise, power pitchers who strike out loads of batters also tend to see their pitch counts a tick higher per inning than finesse pitchers who grab more outs on balls in play. The days of Slim Sallee pitching 227.2 innings in 1919, facing 893 batters and accumulating only 24 strikeouts are a thing of the past.

Here's the full league data since 1900. Check out the SO/9 trend through the game's history ...

YEAR ERA HR H/9 BR/9 SO/9 BB/9 SO/BB SHO WP IBB HBP BFP BK

1900 3.69 254 9.92 13.16 2.45 2.75 0.89 68 220 0 536 6000 16
1901 3.49 463 9.65 12.57 3.21 2.52 1.28 122 472 0 886 30330 18
1902 3.17 354 9.29 12.13 3.03 2.49 1.22 155 416 0 769 31287 17
1903 3.11 334 9.06 11.90 3.65 2.49 1.46 167 446 0 754 81174 12
1904 2.66 330 8.33 11.01 3.81 2.35 1.62 249 508 0 811 90967 42
1905 2.82 328 8.28 11.19 3.92 2.57 1.53 223 527 0 828 58332 22
1906 2.66 257 8.17 11.09 3.77 2.60 1.45 275 461 0 774 55953 29
1907 2.50 238 8.11 11.03 3.59 2.60 1.38 282 473 0 785 88547 23
1908 2.37 267 7.76 10.54 3.67 2.47 1.49 290 477 0 768 89089 25
1909 2.53 262 7.97 10.98 3.79 2.70 1.40 271 568 0 778 89226 39
1910 2.77 359 8.18 11.51 3.94 3.01 1.31 234 544 0 805 90221 33
1911 3.37 514 8.94 12.52 4.04 3.23 1.25 168 539 0 836 91841 49
1912 3.37 442 9.04 12.49 4.02 3.15 1.28 160 559 0 718 91855 45
1913 3.06 472 8.58 11.85 3.86 2.99 1.29 198 529 0 690 91793 51
1914 2.91 705 8.35 11.62 4.02 2.99 1.34 341 799 0 1003 134289 50
1915 2.90 625 8.23 11.50 3.81 3.00 1.27 348 730 0 1009 129250 69
1916 2.72 381 8.12 11.20 3.81 2.83 1.34 236 500 0 629 91095 51
1917 2.68 334 8.14 11.12 3.46 2.75 1.25 248 412 0 575 91661 38
1918 2.77 234 8.36 11.39 2.88 2.81 1.03 199 299 0 458 75635 23
1919 3.07 446 8.77 11.68 3.07 2.67 1.15 189 374 0 529 82870 43
1920 3.46 629 9.41 12.39 2.94 2.76 1.07 186 408 0 546 93899 52
1921 4.03 937 10.12 13.14 2.85 2.79 1.02 120 360 0 564 95612 50
1922 4.06 1054 10.01 13.20 2.82 2.94 0.96 146 382 0 609 96065 55
1923 3.99 981 9.86 13.20 2.86 3.10 0.92 127 359 0 599 96258 40
1924 4.04 896 9.93 13.18 2.72 3.02 0.90 137 338 0 548 95693 53
1925 4.33 1168 10.28 13.69 2.76 3.20 0.86 106 348 0 501 96251 35
1926 3.92 863 9.66 13.01 2.80 3.15 0.89 134 309 0 479 95079 39
1927 4.02 922 9.79 13.03 2.82 3.04 0.93 127 337 0 484 95676 43
1928 4.01 1095 9.70 13.02 2.90 3.13 0.93 132 286 0 460 96571 29
1929 4.47 1349 10.15 13.62 2.90 3.31 0.88 121 355 0 404 96278 44
1930 4.81 1564 10.54 13.85 3.27 3.15 1.04 91 368 0 401 97223 36
1931 4.12 1069 9.84 13.13 3.24 3.14 1.03 134 347 0 370 96196 42
1932 4.18 1357 9.80 13.02 3.20 3.07 1.04 119 368 0 367 96601 41
1933 3.81 1067 9.44 12.61 3.06 3.02 1.01 166 392 0 353 94530 35
1934 4.28 1344 9.94 13.33 3.49 3.25 1.07 136 427 0 341 95515 41
1935 4.24 1326 9.90 13.27 3.30 3.22 1.02 149 419 0 381 96186 37
1936 4.52 1363 10.14 13.75 3.36 3.44 0.98 118 557 0 412 97858 41
1937 4.27 1430 9.76 13.36 3.70 3.47 1.07 134 393 0 318 96118 41
1938 4.28 1474 9.68 13.41 3.47 3.59 0.97 124 410 0 348 95336 46
1939 4.26 1443 9.63 13.28 3.51 3.50 1.00 127 445 0 354 95925 49
1940 4.11 1572 9.39 12.91 3.70 3.37 1.10 140 457 0 354 95912 52
1941 3.89 1333 9.14 12.87 3.58 3.61 0.99 162 481 0 310 96484 33
1942 3.48 1070 8.68 12.26 3.42 3.44 0.99 178 389 0 337 93929 44
1943 3.34 905 8.62 12.10 3.44 3.35 1.03 196 354 0 328 94992 56
1944 3.52 1034 8.99 12.32 3.29 3.19 1.03 177 388 0 340 95629 44
1945 3.58 1001 9.00 12.54 3.30 3.40 0.97 186 358 0 355 94745 51
1946 3.46 1214 8.75 12.45 3.93 3.57 1.10 199 347 0 314 94956 36
1947 3.89 1564 8.98 12.86 3.73 3.76 0.99 176 390 0 306 94931 51
1948 4.12 1556 9.12 13.21 3.70 3.95 0.94 143 433 0 337 95453 47
1949 4.12 1699 9.04 13.29 3.65 4.09 0.89 172 454 0 370 95844 56
1950 4.36 2073 9.24 13.50 3.92 4.08 0.96 139 432 0 437 96364 123
1951 4.04 1865 8.99 12.93 3.79 3.75 1.01 166 442 0 449 96005 65
1952 3.70 1701 8.62 12.38 4.21 3.56 1.18 180 405 0 483 94809 40
1953 4.14 2076 9.17 12.92 4.17 3.55 1.18 156 464 0 487 95420 50
1954 3.90 1937 8.91 12.76 4.15 3.67 1.13 166 402 0 441 95541 45
1955 4.00 2224 8.83 12.73 4.42 3.70 1.20 159 473 736 498 95020 36
1956 3.97 2294 8.82 12.68 4.69 3.67 1.28 127 492 783 481 95233 43
1957 3.83 2202 8.81 12.31 4.82 3.29 1.46 139 480 740 511 95395 46
1958 3.86 2240 8.83 12.35 4.99 3.32 1.50 132 526 680 499 94149 70
1959 3.90 2250 8.81 12.34 5.13 3.33 1.54 158 557 707 496 94722 60
1960 3.82 2128 8.69 12.28 5.19 3.40 1.53 140 604 730 488 94776 55
1961 4.03 2730 8.86 12.57 5.29 3.50 1.51 154 780 732 573 109572 63
1962 3.96 3001 8.85 12.46 5.45 3.39 1.61 168 949 818 709 124544 92
1963 3.46 2704 8.36 11.55 5.81 2.97 1.96 234 914 933 714 122356 194
1964 3.58 2762 8.55 11.74 5.94 2.97 2.00 221 979 1015 694 122993 65
1965 3.50 2688 8.31 11.63 5.95 3.10 1.92 191 1046 1130 720 122763 72
1966 3.52 2743 8.43 11.53 5.83 2.89 2.02 194 1039 1088 682 121688 96
1967 3.30 2299 8.16 11.37 5.99 2.98 2.01 226 985 1295 751 121848 101
1968 2.98 1995 7.91 10.97 5.89 2.82 2.09 279 1007 1223 778 120823 83
1969 3.61 3119 8.40 12.09 5.80 3.46 1.67 242 1284 1436 882 148192 131
1970 3.89 3429 8.66 12.42 5.78 3.54 1.63 188 1249 1464 825 149324 128
1971 3.47 2863 8.43 11.88 5.42 3.25 1.67 265 1115 1396 821 146700 97
1972 3.26 2534 8.19 11.55 5.57 3.16 1.77 295 1069 1378 751 139958 92
1973 3.75 3102 8.78 12.35 5.25 3.38 1.55 236 1199 1356 755 148789 95
1974 3.63 2649 8.75 12.29 5.02 3.34 1.50 227 1086 1353 774 148851 186
1975 3.71 2698 8.78 12.45 5.00 3.47 1.44 223 1158 1338 761 148613 204
1976 3.51 2235 8.66 12.03 4.83 3.19 1.51 261 1047 1156 684 147598 176
1977 4.00 3644 9.07 12.54 5.18 3.28 1.58 176 1166 1297 791 161545 235
1978 3.69 2956 8.76 12.20 4.81 3.26 1.48 238 1054 1338 772 159192 273
1979 4.00 3433 9.10 12.55 4.81 3.27 1.47 175 1146 1366 754 160378 166
1980 3.84 3087 9.07 12.36 4.80 3.14 1.53 189 1031 1435 657 161210 257
1981 3.58 1781 8.66 12.01 4.75 3.18 1.49 135 714 895 464 105892 181
1982 3.86 3379 8.95 12.27 5.04 3.16 1.60 161 1091 1319 677 161104 256
1983 3.87 3301 8.93 12.32 5.18 3.22 1.61 180 1076 1379 717 160615 266
1984 3.81 3258 8.92 12.26 5.37 3.18 1.69 151 1129 1270 668 160566 283
1985 3.89 3602 8.79 12.26 5.37 3.31 1.62 163 1141 1337 699 160320 227
1986 3.97 3813 8.81 12.40 5.90 3.40 1.74 139 1323 1289 812 160858 289
1987 4.29 4458 9.08 12.72 6.01 3.45 1.74 138 1333 1287 842 161922 356
1988 3.73 3180 8.66 11.98 5.58 3.10 1.80 182 1262 1367 918 159380 924
1989 3.71 3083 8.66 12.08 5.64 3.23 1.75 152 1286 1446 801 160033 407
1990 3.86 3317 8.82 12.35 5.72 3.32 1.72 140 1355 1384 861 160316 288
1991 3.91 3383 8.71 12.26 5.81 3.33 1.74 107 1390 1229 905 160746 241
1992 3.75 3038 8.69 12.18 5.60 3.26 1.72 146 1296 1315 980 160545 219
1993 4.19 4030 9.13 12.75 5.85 3.36 1.74 99 1473 1477 1200 174564 298
1994 4.51 3306 9.36 13.14 6.22 3.50 1.78 69 1162 1008 876 124483 174
1995 4.45 4081 9.24 13.10 6.35 3.56 1.79 88 1414 1105 1219 156703 199
1996 4.61 4962 9.39 13.27 6.50 3.57 1.82 84 1553 1343 1404 177261 197
1997 4.39 4640 9.23 13.03 6.66 3.49 1.91 89 1482 1169 1449 175541 188
1998 4.43 5064 9.22 12.95 6.61 3.41 1.94 101 1605 1062 1583 188225 205
1999 4.71 5528 9.44 13.50 6.48 3.73 1.74 64 1632 1105 1578 189692 177
2000 4.77 5693 9.42 13.54 6.53 3.80 1.72 72 1518 1208 1572 190261 161
2001 4.42 5458 9.12 12.80 6.74 3.29 2.05 74 1484 1384 1890 186976 151
2002 4.28 5059 9.00 12.74 6.53 3.38 1.93 87 1494 1452 1746 186615 160
2003 4.40 5207 9.15 12.83 6.40 3.30 1.94 72 1546 1316 1849 187449 158
2004 4.46 5451 9.23 12.98 6.60 3.36 1.96 69 1478 1381 1850 188539 157
2005 4.29 5017 9.16 12.70 6.38 3.17 2.02 63 1439 1216 1797 186292 161

TOT 3.82 226628 8.97 12.45 4.80 3.25 1.48 17655 81768 60666 76606 12482429 11776

[Chip R]

so i wish someone would explain how pitchers in the early days could pitch 20-25 complete games a season!! not counting Spring training, post season and I bet they would laugh at this today!!

so much babying.. i think its indvidual preperation that is part of the problem.. but who knows


They could do it today if they were allowed to. People are bigger and stronger these days. But they would also have more injuries. Back in the early days pitchers had injuries but no one knew what a torn rotator cuff was and things like that. Guys just got sore arms and they either kept pitching or retired. And just think of the minor league pitchers who blew out their arms. All that stuff is undocumented. We have no idea whether their careers were longer or shorter than the pitchers of today.