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RedsManRick
07-24-2009, 01:18 PM
BP has improved their team report pages and now creates these handy summaries. This does NOT include defense, so you should adjust accordingly for overall value -- but it is insightful nonetheless. (and yes, I know VORP has it's issues, but fwiw...)

For those not familiar:
EqA: Equivalent Average. A measure of total offensive value per out, with corrections for league offensive level, home park, and team pitching. EQA considers batting as well as baserunning, but not the value of a position player's defense. The EqA adjusted for all-time also has a correction for league difficulty. The scale is deliberately set to approximate that of batting average. League average EqA is always equal to .260

VORP: Value Over Replacement Player. The number of runs contributed beyond what a replacement-level player at the same position would contribute if given the same percentage of team plate appearances. VORP scores do not consider the quality of a player's defense.

Remeber, 10 runs is approximately equal to 1 win. So replacing Taveras's bat with a replacement player (let's call him Dris Heisubbs) would have netted us about 1 win thus far.

Batting
Position Players: +51.4 runs
Pitchers: +2.1 runs
Total: +53.5 runs

Pitching
Starters: +22.9 runs
Relievers: +50.9 runs (included a -9.7 from Janish)
Total: +73.8 runs

Total: +127.3 runs or ~13 wins above replacement.

Save for the significant defense component of our run prevention, I think that tells the story of 2009 pretty darn well.



Rank Player PA AVG OBP SLG SB CS EqA VORP
1 Joey Votto 260 .352 .435 .599 4 1 .346 31.1
2 Brandon Phillips 369 .271 .335 .465 14 7 .276 16.1
3 Jonny Gomes 123 .305 .398 .571 1 0 .326 12.6
4 Ryan Hanigan 189 .312 .406 .375 0 0 .285 10.4
5 Micah Owings 50 .234 .245 .532 0 0 .256 6.0
6 Chris Dickerson 246 .268 .365 .373 7 3 .268 5.9
7 Laynce Nix 221 .240 .290 .461 0 0 .254 3.5
8 Jerry Hairston 325 .250 .304 .387 7 3 .244 2.8
9 Wilkin Castillo 3 .667 .667 .667 0 0 .501 1.1
10 Edwin Encarnacion 138 .209 .341 .365 1 1 .252 0.7
11 Matt Maloney 5 .250 .250 .250 0 0 .194 0.2
12 Daniel Ray Herrera 4 .000 .333 .000 0 0 .208 0.1
13 Bronson Arroyo 44 .147 .147 .206 0 0 .146 -0.1
14 Arthur Rhodes 1 .000 .000 .000 0 0 -.226 -0.1
15 Jared Burton 1 .000 .000 .000 0 0 -.226 -0.1
16 Ramon Ramirez 1 .000 .000 .000 0 0 .273 -0.1
17 Aaron Harang 40 .143 .167 .171 0 0 .083 -0.2
18 Johnny Cueto 38 .125 .200 .125 0 0 .078 -0.2
19 Ramon Hernandez 316 .249 .330 .355 1 0 .247 -0.2
20 Danny Richar 9 .250 .333 .250 0 0 .212 -0.2
21 Mike Lincoln 2 .000 .000 .000 0 0 -.226 -0.3
22 Craig Tatum 2 .000 .000 .000 0 0 .000 -0.5
23 Drew Sutton 8 .125 .125 .250 0 0 -.058 -1.0
24 Homer Bailey 10 .000 .000 .000 0 0 -.223 -1.4
25 Edinson Volquez 19 .062 .062 .062 0 0 -.144 -1.7
26 Paul Janish 92 .222 .308 .272 0 0 .208 -1.9
27 Jay Bruce 333 .207 .283 .441 3 2 .246 -1.9
28 Darnell McDonald 44 .175 .250 .225 0 0 .154 -3.5
29 Alex Gonzalez 198 .214 .256 .302 0 1 .192 -7.3
30 Adam Rosales 161 .209 .289 .302 0 2 .210 -7.4
31 Willy Taveras 347 .247 .288 .301 19 6 .218 -8.9

Rank Player IP H9 BB9 SO9 HR9 ERA WHIP VORP
1 Johnny Cueto 115.3 8.4 3.0 6.9 1.2 3.67 1.27 18.7
2 Francisco Cordero 38.0 6.2 3.8 7.6 0.2 1.66 1.11 15.2
3 Aaron Harang 121.0 10.6 2.2 7.7 1.3 4.17 1.42 12.9
4 Arthur Rhodes 32.3 5.0 3.9 7.8 0.6 1.67 0.99 12.7
5 Nick Masset 39.7 5.5 3.0 8.2 0.7 2.50 0.93 11.2
6 David Weathers 33.3 6.2 4.1 5.9 1.1 2.97 1.14 9.1
7 Carlos Fisher 25.3 8.2 5.7 8.5 0.0 2.84 1.54 7.3
8 Edinson Volquez 49.7 6.2 5.8 8.5 1.1 4.35 1.33 5.6
9 Daniel Ray Herrera 38.7 9.8 3.3 6.8 0.7 2.56 1.45 5.6
10 Josh Roenicke 12.3 8.8 2.9 8.8 0.0 2.92 1.30 3.4
11 Robert Manuel 4.3 10.4 2.1 4.2 0.0 0.00 1.38 2.6
12 Jared Burton 36.0 10.5 4.3 6.5 0.5 5.25 1.64 0.8
13 Ramon Ramirez 2.3 3.9 3.9 11.6 3.9 7.71 0.86 -0.5
14 Matt Maloney 17.7 9.2 2.6 7.1 3.1 6.11 1.30 -0.8
15 Micah Owings 99.7 10.0 4.5 5.3 1.4 5.33 1.62 -1.4
16 Bronson Arroyo 124.3 9.8 3.4 5.3 1.6 5.21 1.47 -2.2
17 Mike Lincoln 23.0 11.4 7.4 3.5 2.7 8.22 2.09 -6.8
18 Paul Janish 2.0 40.5 9.0 13.5 9.0 49.50 5.50 -9.7
19 Homer Bailey 30.7 8.8 6.2 5.6 1.2 7.63 1.66 -9.9

nate
07-24-2009, 01:21 PM
Great. So we just trade everyone in the red, right?

:cool:

RedsManRick
07-24-2009, 02:03 PM
Great. So we just trade everyone in the red, right?

:cool:

Well... not giving them so much playing time would be a good start.

Replacing Taveras, Rosales, Gonzalez, McDonald, Bailey, Janish (pitching and hitting), and Lincoln wtih replacement level production would have netted us 55.4 runs (5.5 wins). Basically, they're the difference between us and the Cardinals thus far.

LoganBuck
07-24-2009, 02:10 PM
I can't help but laugh every time I see Paul Janish's pitching stats. Seeing them in that context is just hilarious. The next time the clown next to you at the game starts talking about "how hard could it possibly be", point this out.

nate
07-24-2009, 02:16 PM
Well... not giving them so much playing time would be a good start.

Replacing Taveras, Rosales, Gonzalez, McDonald, Bailey, Janish (pitching and hitting), and Lincoln wtih replacement level production would have netted us 55.4 runs (5.5 wins). Basically, they're the difference between us and the Cardinals thus far.

So it's a re-run from last year?

bucksfan2
07-24-2009, 02:56 PM
I can't help but laugh every time I see Paul Janish's pitching stats. Seeing them in that context is just hilarious. The next time the clown next to you at the game starts talking about "how hard could it possibly be", point this out.

I heard that had he stayed at Rice for his Sr. year he would have been converted to a P. It makes you wonder how good of a pitcher he could have been because he has a live arm. His fastball is as straight as an arrow, I wonder if he had a little more movement if he would be more successful.

flyer85
07-24-2009, 03:11 PM
Arroyo (-2.2), amazing how meaningless wins are in revealing pitching performance.

RedsManRick
07-24-2009, 03:35 PM
I got asked in a PM why the Reds keep having so much negative production... I thought I'd share my response.

I would say you have to first differentiate the negative producers in to four categories:

1) Good players having bad seasons: There's not much you can do about these guys. It happens. Usually they'll come back around to the positive by the end of the season -- at minimum they'll likely rebound the following year. Example: Arroyo (yes, he's in decline, but he still should be a positive contributor)

2) Legit prospects getting a shot and not doing well: These guys are tough because they're harder to predict and you've got to give them an extended chance to be solid contributors. I put these guys in the risks-worth-taking category, so long as you cut the cord at a certain point. At least these guys are cheap. Example: Bailey, Rosales, Janish (though less so given his track record).

3) Non-prospects getting a shot and not doing well: When you're 28 and haven't reached the majors, there's usually a good reason for it. A good run in AAA or Spring Training is most often a string of good luck, not a jump in ability. This one comes down to your scouts -- is this guy really a better ball player? Usually the answer is no, but optimism and confirmation bias can be a powerful combination. Example: McDonald.

4) Established major leaguers who just aren't good: This is the biggest problem group and the worst mistake GMs tend to make. Often, this is the result of being blind-sided by one good year that was a perfect storm of peak performance and good luck -- and wholly unrepeatable. Occasionally it's just wishcasting on a prospect who never panned out. Often, it results in committing an inappropriate amount of resources (talent or treasure) given the production you should have expected. Examples: Gonzalez, Lincoln, Taveras.

The sabermetric approach is most valuable with group #4. While new school GMs might miss out on a guy who has put up bad numbers in the past but has great skills, it's an error of omission that doesn't end up hurting the team badly. (Type II error -- excess conservatism). Not signing a good player or promoting a good prospect doesn't help your team, but it doesn't do long term damage.

Meanwhile, old school GMs are more prone to misevaluating players which require significant talent or treasure to acquire. They give Eric Milton a 3 year deal or Gary Matthews Jr. 5. Of course, the classic case is Barry Zito. The signs were all there if you knew where to look. Beane knew, Sabean didn't.

The Reds have cycled through old school GM after old school GM. While they've made good moves like acquiring Phillips for peanuts and selling high on Hamilton, every year the Reds commit excess money and playing time to at least one guy who clearly didn't deserve it from the very start. They think that Alex Gonzalez inability to get on base doesn't matter. They bet (literally) that Willy Taveras is a better bet to produce than Chris Dickerson. They think Josh Fogg belongs in a major league rotation.

Don't get me wrong, scouting and other qualitative evaluations are an enormous part of building a winning team. But in addition to creating opportunity for upside, you have to manage your downside as well. And that's where quantitative analysis is perhaps most useful. It helps you differentiate between flash* and substance** so you can do a better job avoiding big mistakes.

*Flash: A combination of small sample success resulting from "luck", aka variance, and aesthetically pleasing skills/actions that might not be terribly valuable in winning baseball games.

**Substance: A skill base which will support sustained success, including attributes which are undervalued such as plate discipline and defensive range.

GOYA
07-24-2009, 03:37 PM
Whatever the equation is to figure VORP, it has to be a joke. Look at Janish's pitching stats and tell me that guy is better than Homer.

I(heart)Freel
07-24-2009, 03:44 PM
I got asked in a PM why the Reds keep having so much negative production... I thought I'd share my response.



Thanks. Spot-on commentary and thoughtful (ie not kneejerk hyperbole) analysis. Appreciate it.

BuckeyeRedleg
07-24-2009, 04:40 PM
Whatever the equation is to figure VORP, it has to be a joke. Look at Janish's pitching stats and tell me that guy is better than Homer.

He's only thrown 2 innings. Homer has gone 30. If Janish had gone 30 (at the same rate) I'm sure is VORP would be 15 times worse (-130 something).

VORP accumulates (negative and positive) like a counting stat as the season runs it's course.

RedsManRick
07-24-2009, 05:09 PM
Whatever the equation is to figure VORP, it has to be a joke. Look at Janish's pitching stats and tell me that guy is better than Homer.

Janish has allowed 11 ER in 2 IP. How many runs would a guy with a 5.50 ERA (a roughly replacement level pitcher) allow? On average, he'd allow 1.2 runs every 2 IP, or 9.8 runs less than Janish. I'd say the VORP formula gets it pretty close.

Bailey has 26 ER in 30.2 IP. The replacement level pitcher would allow, on average, would allow 18.8, a 7.2 difference.

Is VORP perfect? Of course not, but it's a pretty solid guide.

traderumor
07-24-2009, 05:52 PM
I can't help but laugh every time I see Paul Janish's pitching stats. Seeing them in that context is just hilarious. The next time the clown next to you at the game starts talking about "how hard could it possibly be", point this out.But he is above Homer :(

LoganBuck
07-24-2009, 10:37 PM
But he is above Homer :(

In fairness to Homer nearly every baserunner that he has left on base for the bullpen has been allowed to score. Sure he put them on base, but the bullpen could pick him up a little.

*BaseClogger*
07-25-2009, 09:41 PM
I got asked in a PM why the Reds keep having so much negative production... I thought I'd share my response.

I would say you have to first differentiate the negative producers in to four categories:

1) Good players having bad seasons: There's not much you can do about these guys. It happens. Usually they'll come back around to the positive by the end of the season -- at minimum they'll likely rebound the following year. Example: Arroyo (yes, he's in decline, but he still should be a positive contributor)

2) Legit prospects getting a shot and not doing well: These guys are tough because they're harder to predict and you've got to give them an extended chance to be solid contributors. I put these guys in the risks-worth-taking category, so long as you cut the cord at a certain point. At least these guys are cheap. Example: Bailey, Rosales, Janish (though less so given his track record).

3) Non-prospects getting a shot and not doing well: When you're 28 and haven't reached the majors, there's usually a good reason for it. A good run in AAA or Spring Training is most often a string of good luck, not a jump in ability. This one comes down to your scouts -- is this guy really a better ball player? Usually the answer is no, but optimism and confirmation bias can be a powerful combination. Example: McDonald.

4) Established major leaguers who just aren't good: This is the biggest problem group and the worst mistake GMs tend to make. Often, this is the result of being blind-sided by one good year that was a perfect storm of peak performance and good luck -- and wholly unrepeatable. Occasionally it's just wishcasting on a prospect who never panned out. Often, it results in committing an inappropriate amount of resources (talent or treasure) given the production you should have expected. Examples: Gonzalez, Lincoln, Taveras.

The sabermetric approach is most valuable with group #4. While new school GMs might miss out on a guy who has put up bad numbers in the past but has great skills, it's an error of omission that doesn't end up hurting the team badly. (Type II error -- excess conservatism). Not signing a good player or promoting a good prospect doesn't help your team, but it doesn't do long term damage.

Meanwhile, old school GMs are more prone to misevaluating players which require significant talent or treasure to acquire. They give Eric Milton a 3 year deal or Gary Matthews Jr. 5. Of course, the classic case is Barry Zito. The signs were all there if you knew where to look. Beane knew, Sabean didn't.

The Reds have cycled through old school GM after old school GM. While they've made good moves like acquiring Phillips for peanuts and selling high on Hamilton, every year the Reds commit excess money and playing time to at least one guy who clearly didn't deserve it from the very start. They think that Alex Gonzalez inability to get on base doesn't matter. They bet (literally) that Willy Taveras is a better bet to produce than Chris Dickerson. They think Josh Fogg belongs in a major league rotation.

Don't get me wrong, scouting and other qualitative evaluations are an enormous part of building a winning team. But in addition to creating opportunity for upside, you have to manage your downside as well. And that's where quantitative analysis is perhaps most useful. It helps you differentiate between flash* and substance** so you can do a better job avoiding big mistakes.

*Flash: A combination of small sample success resulting from "luck", aka variance, and aesthetically pleasing skills/actions that might not be terribly valuable in winning baseball games.

**Substance: A skill base which will support sustained success, including attributes which are undervalued such as plate discipline and defensive range.

Normally, I wouldn't bump a thread that is 24 hours old. But I just read through this thread and I had to point out what an awesome post this is... :thumbup: