Would you move Lorenzen to the bull pen?

[SteelSD]

So managers make these decisions based on emotions? So managers let runs score because it makes them feel better?

Awesome, looks like you're starting to get it. Well done.

[Old school 1983]

JJ Hoover has made Price feel better about a lot this season then.

[Kc61]

Meanwhile, back in the real world of baseball, the Reds need three or four new, very good relievers for next year.

Not sure if a run is a run or if an early run is better than a late run or if a starter is better than a reliever or whether relievers should be be developed or you should trade for them.

But if they trot out this group next year, the results will not be pretty. What a disaster this pen has been (one exception, obviously).

[Ironman92]

I have a new metric NWIH+

It measures the likelihood of one RZ poster changing the thoughts/opinions of another RZ poster. A score of "0" means you have a 50/50 chance of convincing and changing their thoughts.

757690 and Steelsd are both sitting at -7,549

[WrongVerb]

I still don't get why there is such a hard distinction between starters and relievers when a pitcher is young. (Note the qualification) Seems to me that if a young pitcher has the arm and stuff to get out major leaguers, then he should be getting out major leaguers. If the rotation is full, then put him in the pen and let him get experience that way. If he fits better in the rotation when he comes up, then let him do that. Don't think "once a reliever, always a reliever" or you're really restricting yourself.

[Ironman92]

Will Iglesias be ready for bullpen action next season?

If so I'd make him the hybrid bullpen guy. Chapman pitches the 9th and on occasion the last 4 or 5 outs while Iglesias is used for the perceived huge moments before Chapman time. Could be the 6th, 7th, 8th innings and be the back up closer.

Tired of the 2nd best guy ONLY being used in the 8th WITH a lead.

Say Leake starts the 7th of a 1-1 game and the first two guys get on.... Bring in the hybrid.

Bullpen is terrible and beyond.

[dougdirt]

MLB Managers in a nutshell:

Attachment 7918

[BCubb2003]

MLB Managers in a nutshell:

Attachment 7918

The conversation is beginning. It will take some time for a "Captain Hook" Sparky to reinvent the bullpen.

[kpresidente]

Meanwhile, back in the real world of baseball, the Reds need three or four new, very good relievers for next year.

Not sure if a run is a run or if an early run is better than a late run or if a starter is better than a reliever or whether relievers should be be developed or you should trade for them.

But if they trot out this group next year, the results will not be pretty. What a disaster this pen has been (one exception, obviously).

It's essentially the same group that ranked 4th in the NL in ERA in 2013. They'll probably bounce back. Here's why:

..................................ERA.........xFIP
2013..........................3.29.......3.64
2014..........................4.04.......3.79
All Pitchers 3 year....3.42.......3.73

So Reds pitchers generally over the years, and the pen last year, have outperformed their xFIP by a third of a run (credit the defense), but this year the pen underperforms by a third of a run. I see a comeback.

[Kc61]

It's essentially the same group that ranked 4th in the NL in ERA in 2013. They'll probably bounce back. Here's why:

..................................ERA.........xFIP
2013..........................3.29.......3.64
2014..........................4.04.......3.79
All Pitchers 3 year....3.42.......3.73

So Reds pitchers generally over the years, and the pen last year, have outperformed their xFIP by a third of a run (credit the defense), but this year the pen underperforms by a third of a run. I see a comeback.

Reds bullpen is up one full walk per nine innings.

Chapman pitched a full season in 2013 so that helps the 2013 numbers.

Reds pen is 10-29 W-L this year, which must be partially attributable to inability to pitch in well in close games. Bad offense obviously a factor.

The pen will change pretty dramatically for next year regardless of predicted turn arounds.

[RedTeamGo!]

I would look at Howard and Lorenzen, figure out which one has a better chance of being a MLB starting pitcher (probably Lorenzen) and fast-track the other to the majors as a late innings reliever (probably Howard).

[Plus Plus]

If all runs have equal value, then why do managers let the other team score some runs in exchange for outs?

In a 5-1 game, bases loaded, no outs, fifth inning. teams set up for the double play, conceding the run scoring, in order to increase their chances of getting two outs.

In 1-1 game, bases loaded, no outs, ninth inning, teams bring the infield in, and go for the strikeout or popup. They won't concede that run, because that run is more valuable, because it is more decisive in deciding who wins the game.

If all IP are of equal value, why do managers bring in their relievers in reverse order of effectiveness? The 7th inning guy isn't as good as the 8th inning guy, who isn't as good as the 9th inning guy. Why? Because the 9th inning is more valuable than the 8th inning, which is more valuable than the 7th inning.

I think that there is a little bit of confusion due to the fact that there are multiple moving parts in any baseball game, and that the game isn't as simple as the situations you are giving make it out to be. You are correct in saying that being behind 3-0 after the top of the first is really different than being behind 3-0 after the top of the 6th, and even more different than being behind 3-0 after the top of the 9th, and you are also correct in saying that better pitchers generally pitch in greater leverage situations.

Problem 1 with using WPA to evaluate players, specifically bench specialists such as bullpen arms or pinch hitters, is that you can be shoehorned into situations where, at the end of the season, your WPA would be significantly different than if you were used differently. For example, a guy who is often used as a fireman will have a high WPA simply because of his utilization, whereas a closer who comes in only in the beginning of the 9th and allows literally 0 hits, 0 runs, 0 walks, and strikes out 27/9 would have a comparatively low WPA because he never puts anyone in a situation to score.

The problem is that the greatest leverage situation might not happen in the 9th. If you are in a 1-1 game, and your opponent has the bases loaded with nobody out in the 7th, you are probably at the greatest risk of losing the game right then- independent of what happens in innings 8 and 9. Bringing in Logan Ondrusek, Sam LeCure, or Manny Parra is therefore a poor decision because, compared to an arm like Aroldis Chapman, they are not as likely to "get the job done." Are you possibly punting Chapman's availability in the 9th? Sure. But are you putting yourself in a situation to limit runs with a greater likelihood than bringing in your 7th inning guy? Absolutely. And that's where using WPA to evaluate player utilization gets tricky.

Another issue with your stance that I am struggling with is the fact that you are evaluating the currency of a baseball game in terms of only one variable, when, in fact, there are multiple. Runs are the dictating feature in terms of wins and losses, but within the game you have to look at the value of an out, the value of using a reliever in a specific situation, the value of using a pinch hitter, the value of replacing a poor fielder with a good one at (maybe) the expense of hitting later, and even the effect that weather can have on the game. Combine these elements with the fact that baseball is played by humans, not robots, and the fact that baseball is really hard, and you have quite the variance within the game. As mentioned above, using Chapman to subdue a threat in the 7th inning might be the best play, given the state of the Reds bullpen right now. The fact that he isn't used in the 7th inning because he is the "closer" is the effect of 45 years of managing with the save as a statistic. Not to speak for SteelSD, but I think that this is kind of where he's going with this- if you allow 3 runs in the 7th and are then down 4-1, the landscape of the rest of the game is changed and you might never have a chance to even be in a situation to win. Imagine if Ondrusek came in to a situation like this, gave up a hit, put the Reds down 4-1, and then the Reds scored two more to lose 4-3... bringing in Chapman might have led to a 3-1 win, since he is absolutely a better arm than Ondrusek.

At the end of the day, what any team should strive to do is score as many runs as they can and allow as few as they can. In the situations that you have described, your timeline within the game is explicitly different- giving up a run in the 9th in a tie game is pretty obviously a bigger deal than giving up a run in the fifth inning in a 4-run game. There simply aren't enough of the 27 sands left in the hourglass to feel confident that you will score, given run expectancy for the remainder of the game. A more interesting example would be how some managers will bring the infield in with runners on the corners and 1 out in a 1-run game- that's a tactical situation that could actually be discussed and debated.

Score as many runs as you can. Allow as few as you can. That's the end line- everything else is noise and variance that needs to do everything that it can to get you to the point where you have scored more runs than you allow. Leverage doesn't matter- preventing runs does. Using your best pitchers to pitch the most innings is a great first step towards this, and if someone is a better starter than those currently on the team, then he should be starting- not closing due to WPA or ERA- or WAR or W/L or SV% or anything.

[Patrick Bateman]

I think that there is a little bit of confusion due to the fact that there are multiple moving parts in any baseball game, and that the game isn't as simple as the situations you are giving make it out to be. You are correct in saying that being behind 3-0 after the top of the first is really different than being behind 3-0 after the top of the 6th, and even more different than being behind 3-0 after the top of the 9th, and you are also correct in saying that better pitchers generally pitch in greater leverage situations.

Problem 1 with using WPA to evaluate players, specifically bench specialists such as bullpen arms or pinch hitters, is that you can be shoehorned into situations where, at the end of the season, your WPA would be significantly different than if you were used differently. For example, a guy who is often used as a fireman will have a high WPA simply because of his utilization, whereas a closer who comes in only in the beginning of the 9th and allows literally 0 hits, 0 runs, 0 walks, and strikes out 27/9 would have a comparatively low WPA because he never puts anyone in a situation to score.

The problem is that the greatest leverage situation might not happen in the 9th. If you are in a 1-1 game, and your opponent has the bases loaded with nobody out in the 7th, you are probably at the greatest risk of losing the game right then- independent of what happens in innings 8 and 9. Bringing in Logan Ondrusek, Sam LeCure, or Manny Parra is therefore a poor decision because, compared to an arm like Aroldis Chapman, they are not as likely to "get the job done." Are you possibly punting Chapman's availability in the 9th? Sure. But are you putting yourself in a situation to limit runs with a greater likelihood than bringing in your 7th inning guy? Absolutely. And that's where using WPA to evaluate player utilization gets tricky.

Another issue with your stance that I am struggling with is the fact that you are evaluating the currency of a baseball game in terms of only one variable, when, in fact, there are multiple. Runs are the dictating feature in terms of wins and losses, but within the game you have to look at the value of an out, the value of using a reliever in a specific situation, the value of using a pinch hitter, the value of replacing a poor fielder with a good one at (maybe) the expense of hitting later, and even the effect that weather can have on the game. Combine these elements with the fact that baseball is played by humans, not robots, and the fact that baseball is really hard, and you have quite the variance within the game. As mentioned above, using Chapman to subdue a threat in the 7th inning might be the best play, given the state of the Reds bullpen right now. The fact that he isn't used in the 7th inning because he is the "closer" is the effect of 45 years of managing with the save as a statistic. Not to speak for SteelSD, but I think that this is kind of where he's going with this- if you allow 3 runs in the 7th and are then down 4-1, the landscape of the rest of the game is changed and you might never have a chance to even be in a situation to win. Imagine if Ondrusek came in to a situation like this, gave up a hit, put the Reds down 4-1, and then the Reds scored two more to lose 4-3... bringing in Chapman might have led to a 3-1 win, since he is absolutely a better arm than Ondrusek.

At the end of the day, what any team should strive to do is score as many runs as they can and allow as few as they can. In the situations that you have described, your timeline within the game is explicitly different- giving up a run in the 9th in a tie game is pretty obviously a bigger deal than giving up a run in the fifth inning in a 4-run game. There simply aren't enough of the 27 sands left in the hourglass to feel confident that you will score, given run expectancy for the remainder of the game. A more interesting example would be how some managers will bring the infield in with runners on the corners and 1 out in a 1-run game- that's a tactical situation that could actually be discussed and debated.

Score as many runs as you can. Allow as few as you can. That's the end line- everything else is noise and variance that needs to do everything that it can to get you to the point where you have scored more runs than you allow. Leverage doesn't matter- preventing runs does. Using your best pitchers to pitch the most innings is a great first step towards this, and if someone is a better starter than those currently on the team, then he should be starting- not closing due to WPA or ERA- or WAR or W/L or SV% or anything.

Thanks for posting this. I was going to post something similar, but no need to now.

I don't understand how someone could actually be trying to debate this topic without understanding the concepts you discuss in your post.

[Kc61]

One of the problems, also, is that baseball games are not played on computer.

So when you say use Chapman in the highest leverage situations you could be ignoring certain issues.

1. His comfort level being used differently every day -- his dependence on a set role.
2. The decision when to warm him up. Every time "leverage" may be headed our way?
3. What happens when "leverage" comes up suddenly and, whoops, Chapman has not been warmed up?
4. Can you have 4 or 5 relievers that escape all "leveraged" situations? Just how many mop up innings are available in a season, as compared with higher leverage situations.

Anyone who has ever managed people understands that there is a practical element to this. Ultimately you need as many good starters and relievers as you can get so that you can cover almost any situation with a capable pitcher. Usage will be imperfect, especially since we're dealing with humans with comfort zones and limitations.

[757690]

I think that there is a little bit of confusion due to the fact that there are multiple moving parts in any baseball game, and that the game isn't as simple as the situations you are giving make it out to be. You are correct in saying that being behind 3-0 after the top of the first is really different than being behind 3-0 after the top of the 6th, and even more different than being behind 3-0 after the top of the 9th, and you are also correct in saying that better pitchers generally pitch in greater leverage situations.

Problem 1 with using WPA to evaluate players, specifically bench specialists such as bullpen arms or pinch hitters, is that you can be shoehorned into situations where, at the end of the season, your WPA would be significantly different than if you were used differently. For example, a guy who is often used as a fireman will have a high WPA simply because of his utilization, whereas a closer who comes in only in the beginning of the 9th and allows literally 0 hits, 0 runs, 0 walks, and strikes out 27/9 would have a comparatively low WPA because he never puts anyone in a situation to score.

The problem is that the greatest leverage situation might not happen in the 9th. If you are in a 1-1 game, and your opponent has the bases loaded with nobody out in the 7th, you are probably at the greatest risk of losing the game right then- independent of what happens in innings 8 and 9. Bringing in Logan Ondrusek, Sam LeCure, or Manny Parra is therefore a poor decision because, compared to an arm like Aroldis Chapman, they are not as likely to "get the job done." Are you possibly punting Chapman's availability in the 9th? Sure. But are you putting yourself in a situation to limit runs with a greater likelihood than bringing in your 7th inning guy? Absolutely. And that's where using WPA to evaluate player utilization gets tricky.

Another issue with your stance that I am struggling with is the fact that you are evaluating the currency of a baseball game in terms of only one variable, when, in fact, there are multiple. Runs are the dictating feature in terms of wins and losses, but within the game you have to look at the value of an out, the value of using a reliever in a specific situation, the value of using a pinch hitter, the value of replacing a poor fielder with a good one at (maybe) the expense of hitting later, and even the effect that weather can have on the game. Combine these elements with the fact that baseball is played by humans, not robots, and the fact that baseball is really hard, and you have quite the variance within the game. As mentioned above, using Chapman to subdue a threat in the 7th inning might be the best play, given the state of the Reds bullpen right now. The fact that he isn't used in the 7th inning because he is the "closer" is the effect of 45 years of managing with the save as a statistic. Not to speak for SteelSD, but I think that this is kind of where he's going with this- if you allow 3 runs in the 7th and are then down 4-1, the landscape of the rest of the game is changed and you might never have a chance to even be in a situation to win. Imagine if Ondrusek came in to a situation like this, gave up a hit, put the Reds down 4-1, and then the Reds scored two more to lose 4-3... bringing in Chapman might have led to a 3-1 win, since he is absolutely a better arm than Ondrusek.

At the end of the day, what any team should strive to do is score as many runs as they can and allow as few as they can. In the situations that you have described, your timeline within the game is explicitly different- giving up a run in the 9th in a tie game is pretty obviously a bigger deal than giving up a run in the fifth inning in a 4-run game. There simply aren't enough of the 27 sands left in the hourglass to feel confident that you will score, given run expectancy for the remainder of the game. A more interesting example would be how some managers will bring the infield in with runners on the corners and 1 out in a 1-run game- that's a tactical situation that could actually be discussed and debated.

Score as many runs as you can. Allow as few as you can. That's the end line- everything else is noise and variance that needs to do everything that it can to get you to the point where you have scored more runs than you allow. Leverage doesn't matter- preventing runs does. Using your best pitchers to pitch the most innings is a great first step towards this, and if someone is a better starter than those currently on the team, then he should be starting- not closing due to WPA or ERA- or WAR or W/L or SV% or anything.

First, I discussed all of this earlier, more than once. I understand if you haven't read the whole thread, so I will address this again.

As I have previously said, the value of an inning is determined by many different elements. What inning it is, is just one of those elements. How many runners are on base, the score, who is batting, etc, all determine the value of an inning. So I agree, and have agreed from the beginning, that the 7th inning can be more valuable than the 9th. And WPA tells us this, which is why it's a very important and valuable stat.

But the central point still stands, that some innings are of more value than others. Once you admit that, then you can't also believe your last paragraph. If some innings and some runs are more important than others, than we can't believe that the key is simply to score as many runs as possible and to prevent as many runs as possible. We also need to pay attention to when runs are scored, and when scoreless innings are pitched. How can you claim that leverage exists, but doesn't matter at the same time?