In his 1988 Baseball Abstract, Bill James wrote that “The strike zone is the very heart of a baseball game. An inch in the strike zone means far more than ten yards in the outfield.” It seems to be such a simple concept, but few seem to grasp just how important the strike zone really is. It’s a 17 x 30-inch vertical space on a baseball field, and occupies only 510 square inches, but its magnitude of importance generally determines who wins and who doesn’t. For hitters, those guys who control the strike zone better than their peers – hitters who have what is known as plate discipline – are much better at setting them up in situations that allows them to tear the cover off the ball.
Most people seem to place a sort of loose definition on plate discipline as it pertains to walks. Hitters who walk often get the label of having good plate discipline while hitters who do not walk get tagged as having poor plate discipline. For starters, this is a decent quick’n dirty way to analyze plate discipline, but if we want to really find out which hitters are more disciplined than others we need to take a look at other factors, primarily the following:
- Hitters being able to work the count into a hitter’s count.
- Hitters being able to avoid allowing the pitcher working the count into a pitcher’s count.
- Hitters being able to avoid getting stuck in a two-strike count.
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Let’s first analyze hitters’ counts by looking at team and league totals for the 2005 season. The acronym HCPA stands for Hitters’ Counts Plate Appearances and HCPA% is the percentage of all plate appearances that ended in a hitters’ count.
Code:
Teams HCPA OPS Total PA HCPA %
San Diego 2405 .920 6271 38.351%
New York (A) 2455 1.020 6406 38.323%
Philadelphia 2426 .966 6345 38.235%
Boston 2403 1.023 6403 37.529%
Cincinnati 2344 1.055 6321 37.083%
Arizona 2335 1.009 6327 36.905%
Los Angeles (N) 2233 .913 6134 36.404%
Texas 2277 1.054 6301 36.137%
Oakland 2247 .960 6275 35.809%
Toronto 2224 .963 6233 35.681%
Atlanta 2207 1.060 6186 35.677%
Cleveland 2225 1.032 6255 35.572%
Seattle 2162 .954 6095 35.472%
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Milwaukee 2143 1.017 6156 34.812%
Los Angeles (A) 2126 .952 6186 34.368%
Minnesota 2120 .953 6192 34.238%
Baltimore 2090 .993 6134 34.072%
New York (N) 2087 1.006 6146 33.957%
St. Louis 2115 .999 6246 33.862%
Colorado 2110 1.011 6238 33.825%
Washington 2073 .946 6142 33.751%
San Francisco 2020 .917 6077 33.240%
Chicago (N) 2031 .982 6161 32.965%
Tampa Bay 2016 .937 6120 32.941%
Pittsburgh 2049 .979 6221 32.937%
Florida 2041 .928 6214 32.845%
Houston 2005 .982 6139 32.660%
Chicago (A) 2006 .930 6146 32.639%
Detroit 1970 .962 6136 32.106%
Kansas City 1948 .931 6086 32.008%
League 64893 .979 186292 34.834%
Check out the league average OPS for all plate appearances that ended in a hitter’s count, an amazing .979. In fact, the line as a whole is .305/.470/.509, which is quite literally a Hall of Fame caliber offensive machine.
Another key column in the above chart, and one I’d like to concentrate on, is HCPA%, or the percentage of all plate appearances that ended in a hitter’s counts. Consider that if the average hitter is able to put up a .979 OPS while in a hitter’s counts, then it makes sense that individual hitters (and teams) who work themselves into more hitting counts than their peers will enjoy a significant offensive advantage.
The league average percentage in 2005 for plate appearances that ended in a hitter’s count is 34.834 percent. Teams such as the San Diego Padres, New York Yankees and Philadephia Phillies enjoyed the most plate appearances ending in hitter’s counts, with each team crossing over the 38 percent barrier. The Cincinnati Reds were fifth in the majors at 37.083 percent. Another way to look at it: if the Kansas City Royals enjoyed the same percentage of plate appearances in hitting counts as the San Diego Padres, they would have had 386 more plate appearances in a hitting count than they actually had. That would have been an additional 386 plate appearances where they would have enjoyed offense at well over a .900 OPS clip instead of offense at an average (or worse) OPS. In short, they would have scored quite a few more runs – and won quite a few more games – if their hitters simply worked the count better.
When we dig deeper into the numbers on an individual basis, it gets even more interesting. I’ll simply use the 2005 league average mark as an overall league average mark for all comparisons. The figure likely fluctuates slightly season by season, but it should resemble a stable enough mark to use in all comparisons.
First, here is what I will call the Fab Five, five of the best hitters from this generation and how they’ve fared in setting up their plate appearances in hitting counts:
Code:
Player HCPA OPS Total PA HCPA % HCPA+
Barry Bonds 5276 1.287 10519 50.157% 144
Frank Thomas 4304 1.198 8602 50.035% 144
Jeff Bagwell 4161 1.174 9428 44.134% 127
Albert Pujols 1404 1.283 3427 40.969% 118
Alex Rodriguez 2718 1.200 7084 38.368% 110
For HCPA+, think of it like OPS+ as I’m merely comparing each hitters’ HCPA% to the league average mark of 34.834 percent. A 100 mark for HCPA+ is league average, above 100 is above average and below 100 is below average.
Those are career figures for all five guys, and check out those career OPS marks for each of them when they’ve been ahead in the count. Great hitters who hit in hitting counts will hit greater than – or sometimes better than – Babe Ruth and Ted Williams. The more often you place yourself in a hitting count, the more often you will enjoy the advantage to hit like legends.
Barry Bonds during his run from 2001-2004 hit in a hitting count nearly 60 percent of the time. For his career as a total, his mark of hitting in a hitting count is still amazingly more than half of his total plate appearances. Frank Thomas has nearly matched him, and others such as Pujols, Rodriguez and Bagwell have been well above the league average at getting into hitting counts.
The key question for Reds fans is how to our current (and notable past) Reds hitters shape up?
Code:
Player HCPA OPS Total PA HCPA % HCPA+
Adam Dunn 1244 1.186 2782 44.716% 128
Scott Hatteberg 1674 1.003 3847 43.514% 125
Austin Kearns 609 1.061 1467 41.513% 119
Edwin Encarnacion 95 1.034 234 40.598% 117
Ken Griffey, Jr 3573 1.132 9053 39.468% 113
Ryan Freel 446 .882 1187 37.574% 108
Rich Aurilia* 173 .991 467 37.045% 106
Sean Casey 1627 1.030 4490 36.236% 104
Felipe Lopez 588 1.065 1663 35.358% 102
Javier Valentin 364 .961 1049 34.700% 100
Jason LaRue 729 .961 2303 31.654% 91
Wily Mo Pena 268 .942 897 29.877% 86
Tony Womack 1556 .881 5256 29.604% 85
* Due to site errors, I only had access to Aurilia's 2005 splits
Taking a glance at these figures, is this what you would expect? Adam Dunn is the leader in getting himself into more hitting counts, with the Pickin’ Machine right behind him. Kearns has fared very well, and in Encarnacion’s small sample thus far he has also done very well at getting himself into a hitting count.
How about Sean Casey, however? For all the hoopla over Casey being a supposed situational hitter, not striking out and making contact, he’s been essentially a league average hitter when it comes to actually getting himself in a hitting count. Not only that, but while he’s a good hitter once he is in a hitting count, he still trails Adam Dunn by over 150 points in OPS as a hitter in a hitting count. Also to note, not surprisingly, Wily Mo Pena and Tony Womack are the trailers as they each really have no clue how to work the strike zone.
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Next, let’s use the same process to track how well teams and hitters are able to avoid getting caught in a pitcher’s count, with PCPA being pitchers' count PA:
Code:
Team PCPA OPS Total PA PCPA %
New York (A) 1802 .616 6406 28.130%
Boston 1832 .594 6403 28.612%
San Diego 1826 .527 6271 29.118%
Cleveland 1844 .586 6255 29.480%
Atlanta 1828 .511 6186 29.551%
Cincinnati 1882 .537 6321 29.774%
Philadelphia 1902 .561 6345 29.976%
Texas Rangers 1894 .564 6301 30.059%
Arizona 1909 .514 6327 30.172%
Los Angeles (N) 1851 .511 6134 30.176%
San Francisco 1851 .490 6077 30.459%
Oakland 1917 .548 6275 30.550%
Seattle 1877 .518 6095 30.796%
Los Angeles (A) 1914 .547 6186 30.941%
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Milwaukee 1914 .515 6156 31.092%
Houston 1910 .517 6139 31.113%
St. Louis 1949 .580 6246 31.204%
Toronto 1950 .569 6233 31.285%
Chicago (N) 1933 .573 6161 31.375%
Baltimore 1938 .575 6134 31.594%
Colorado 1978 .527 6238 31.709%
Minnesota 1969 .564 6192 31.799%
Chicago (A) 1966 .549 6146 31.988%
Washington 1980 .529 6142 32.237%
New York (N) 1987 .512 6146 32.330%
Kansas City 1994 .529 6086 32.764%
Pittsburgh 2039 .522 6221 32.776%
Tampa Bay 2007 .584 6120 32.794%
Florida 2047 .575 6214 32.942%
Detroit 2048 .569 6136 33.377%
League 57738 .547 186292 30.993%
Yep, that’s right, when a plate appearances ends with the count in the pitcher’s favor, the average hitter has a whopping .547 OPS. The straight line across is .216/.226/.322. What’s amazing to note is that the league average slugging percentage is nearly 200 points lower when the count ends in a pitchers’ count instead of in a hitters’ count. If you’re at the plate and have two strikes on you, you’re rarely going to get anything worthwhile to hit, and the numbers really bear that out.
Likewise, when teams and individual hitters get stuck in pitchers’ counts more often than their peers, they really struggle at the plate. The Tigers were dead last, getting caught in a pitchers’ count in over 33 percent of their total plate appearances. The New York Yankees led the majors as their total plate appearances ending in a pitcher’s count were just a shade over 28 percent. The Reds again scored well, ranking 6th in the majors at being able to avoid pitching counts.
It’s really rather simple: the more often you avoid the pitcher’s count, the more often you can avoid that .547 OPS.
How about individual hitters, the Fab Five and notable Reds hitters?
Code:
Player PCPA OPS Total PA PCPA % PCPA+
Barry Bonds 1839 .703 10519 17.483% 177
Frank Thomas 1653 .694 8602 19.216% 161
Jeff Bagwell 2211 .670 9428 23.451% 132
Albert Pujols 902 .785 3427 26.291% 118
Alex Rodriguez 2078 .738 7084 29.334% 106
Again, Barry Bonds and Frank Thomas have just obliterated everybody else, but Jeff Bagwell and Albert Pujols have also been excellent at being able to avoid getting caught in a pitchers’ count. Alex Rodriguez, surprisingly, is just above average. As can be seen by their OPS figures in a pitching count, if you can get ahead of these guys, they’re still relatively harmless and you have a much better chance at getting them out. Only Albert Pujols has been able to maintain some moderate success when caught behind in the count.
How about notable Reds hitters?
Code:
Player PCPA OPS Total PA PCPA % PCPA+
Adam Dunn 661 .481 2782 23.760% 130
Austin Kearns 356 .490 1467 24.267% 128
Ken Griffey, Jr 2292 .692 9053 25.318% 122
Scott Hatteberg 987 .520 3847 25.656% 121
Rich Aurilia* 120 .583 467 25.696% 121
Edwin Encarnacion 62 .468 234 26.496% 117
Ryan Freel 324 .593 1187 27.296% 114
Javier Valentin 298 .406 1049 28.408% 110
Sean Casey 1339 .675 4490 29.822% 104
Jason LaRue 738 .538 2303 32.045% 97
Wily Mo Pena 294 .419 897 32.776% 95
Felipe Lopez 548 .512 1663 32.952% 94
Tony Womack 1961 .502 5256 37.310% 83
* Due to site errors, I only had access to Aurilia's 2005 splits
Just as he led the group in getting himself into hitting counts, Adam Dunn leads the group in avoiding pitching counts. What’s also very encouraging is Austin Kearns and Edwin Encarnacion also fare very well in avoiding pitching counts, just as they fare well in getting themselves in hitting counts. The Pickin’ Machine, Scott Hatteberg, also ranks high on the list.
Sean Casey? Barely above league average once again. For all the hoopla with him avoiding strikeouts and putting the ball in play, he sure falls well short of other hitters in the group at being able to avoid giving the pitcher an advantage during a plate appearance. Wily Mo Pena again looks frighteningly bad, Felipe Lopez is also not looking hot and Tony Womack is just a plain bad hitter.
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Finally, let’s track the last bullet about plate discipline, avoiding getting caught in a two-strike count. I do not have detailed team and league figures for two-strike counts as I do for overall hitting and pitching counts, but I was able to dig up enough data to use for a decent analysis.
2005 two-strike BA: .192
2005 two-strike OBP: .262
2005 two-strike SLG: .293
2005 two-strike OPS: .555
~ TPA ending with two-strikes: 86,000
~ Percentage of all TPA that ended with two-strikes: 46.164 percent
I was unable to find exact SF and HBP league figures with two-strikes so the total plate appearances figure may be off by 1 percent or so, but should still be close enough to be able to analyze. In all of 2005, there were 186,292 plate appearances in the major leagues, and approximately 86,000 of those plate appearances ended with the hitter having two strikes – AKA the kiss of death – pinned on them. As can be seen with the league OPS figures, if a hitter is caught with two strikes, their OPS plummets down to .555. In fact, if it weren’t for 3-2 full counts, that OPS figure would be much much lower, perhaps even well under .500. Most, if not all, hitters (even great hitters) turn into your typical hitting pitcher when attempting to hit on counts of 0-2, 1-2 and 2-2.
Here’s the fab five again, with 2SPA being two-strike PA:
Code:
Player 2SPA OPS Total PA 2SPA % 2SPA+
Barry Bonds 3953 .775 10519 37.580% 123
Albert Pujols 1457 .812 3427 42.515% 109
Frank Thomas 3807 .732 8602 44.257% 104
Jeff Bagwell 4359 .722 9428 46.235% 100
Alex Rodriguez 3553 .703 7084 50.155% 92
Again, Barry Bonds just seems to dominate the group as he is far ahead of everyone else in being able to avoid getting stuck in a two-strike count. Albert Pujols and Frank Thomas are above average in avoiding two-strike counts, while Jeff Bagwell is average and Alex Rodriguez, surprisingly, is below average in being able to avoid two-strike counts.
Let’s break the two-strike counts down further:
Code:
OPS By Count
Player 0-2 1-2 2-2 3-2
Barry Bonds .484 .510 .693 1.057
Albert Pujols .563 .694 .764 1.138
Frank Thomas .556 .590 .567 .984
Jeff Bagwell .458 .590 .613 .992
Alex Rodriguez .568 .610 .632 .953
As can be seen, even the very best hitters in the game are terribly weak when caught in a two-strike count that isn’t a full 3-2 count. Only by working the count back to 3-2 are these hitters able to put themselves in position where they can do damage once again. Albert Pujols is well-known for being a great two-strike hitter, but even at 0-2 and 1-2 he’s like an average light hitting shortstop.
Now for the Reds’ figures:
Code:
Player 2SPA OPS Total PA 2SPA % 2SPA+
Sean Casey 1707 .635 4490 38.018% 122
Ken Griffey, Jr 3878 .663 9053 42.837% 108
Javier Valentin 453 .531 1049 43.184% 107
Rich Aurilia* 204 .603 467 43.683% 106
Scott Hatteberg 1780 .570 3847 46.270% 100
Tony Womack 2555 .506 5256 48.611% 95
Austin Kearns 738 .538 1467 50.307% 92
Ryan Freel 605 .598 1187 50.969% 91
Edwin Encarnacion 120 .495 234 51.282% 90
Jason LaRue 1186 .479 2303 51.498% 90
Felipe Lopez 867 .561 1663 52.135% 89
Wily Mo Pena 484 .410 897 53.958% 86
Adam Dunn 1552 .586 2782 55.787% 83
* Due to site errors, I only had access to Aurilia's 2005 splits
Very interesting. Sean Casey ranks first in this group at being able to avoid two-strike counts while Adam Dunn ranks last. Now before anyone starts railing on Dunn again, it is important to note that 37 percent of Dunn’s plate appearances with two strikes also happen to be 3-2 full counts compared to only 25 percent of Casey’s two-strike plate appearances coming on a full count. Why is this important? Let’s take a look at the group by count with two strikes:
Code:
OPS By Count
Player 0-2 1-2 2-2 3-2
Sean Casey .596 .581 .534 .839
Ken Griffey, Jr .512 .535 .614 .921
Javier Valentin .400 .301 .609 .828
Rich Aurilia* .667 .293 .600 .936
Scott Hatteberg .418 .464 .462 .853
Tony Womack .426 .427 .483 .803
Austin Kearns .460 .260 .370 .903
Ryan Freel .315 .531 .465 .918
Edwin Encarnacion .294 .276 .378 .924
Jason LaRue .271 .450 .428 .753
Felipe Lopez .386 .480 .386 1.011
Wily Mo Pena .204 .314 .507 .605
Adam Dunn .417 .334 .497 .887
* Due to site errors, I only had access to Aurilia's 2005 splits
Notice the clear pattern: Nobody hits well at 0-2, 1-2 or 2-2. Only by working the count full to 3-2 do the OPS figures start to become decent, unless you’re Wily Mo Pena, of course.
What does the bulk of this information tell us? Basically, common sense still, that by laying off bad pitches and working the count in your favor that you as a hitter are setting yourself up in a situation to be very successful. If you’re constantly swinging at garbage – regardless if you make contact or not – or constantly behind in the count, you’re oftentimes going to fail as a hitter. Aggressive, contact hitters such as Sean Casey get themselves into trouble by flailing away at stuff out of the strike zone. More patient hitters who are willing to work the count will take the pitch as a ball, and work the count in their favor.
Think of it like this: when Sean Casey swings at a bad pitch and makes contact, he usually makes an out. When Adam Dunn swings at a pitch and misses, he’s helping to put himself in position to make an out, but hasn’t yet made the out. This is why such blanket statements as “if he reduces his strikeouts, he will gain hits” fall flat on its face. The people advocating Dunn to reduce his strikeouts argue for him to lose plate discipline by swinging and making contact with more pitches out of the strike zone. In fact, it should be the other way around as everybody should be arguing for Dunn to gain even more plate discipline.
Imagine all the scenarios you see Adam Dunn in a 1-1 count where the next pitch is a ball low and out of the zone. Dunn can either A) take the ball to make the count 2-1, B) swing and miss to make the count 1-2 or C) swing and make contact, likely making an out since the pitch was so poor. Option C is equally as worse as Option B, and there is no benefit to substituting C for B. This is the precise reason why offensive strikeouts have very little bearing on actual run scoring; in place of the strikeouts, hitters usually just swing at bad pitches that result in a high out making efficiency, including double plays.
In the above example, Dunn should resort to Option A, taking the pitch for a ball and getting himself in a hitting count where he can do some serious damage. As shown way above in his rate of reaching hitting counts and avoiding pitching counts, Dunn already does this better than any other current or recent Reds hitter.
This is the virtue and value of plate discipline. Take pitches, lay off swinging at garbage, work the count in your favor and hammer good pitches in the strike zone. Hitters that are able to accomplish those feats at a rate higher than their peers will likely have quite a bit of success, and that never has been a secret to hitting. What may have been a secret to hitting, however, is the rate at which hitters can get into hitting counts, avoid pitching counts and avoid two-strike counts.
For the Reds, Adam Dunn's been better in that regard than everyone else we've had in our lineup.
Originally Posted by ochre
