Poor Kevin Cash

[M2]

Those next two outs were crucial to the game, Betts and LH Seager who had been red hot.

How crucial they were is debatable. The WPA value of those outs wasn't anything notable (kind of generic outs). If you feel those were the two most important outs of the game, that's an opinion I do not share.

And Cash went to his top relievers when Snell left and they gave up runs. So if Snell isn't going a full game (and he's guaranteed not doing that), those same guys come in and the Dodgers touch them up. You can make the case for going straight to Castillo, but the Dodgers got to him too earlier in the series. The best case scenario for the Rays is Snell leaving at some point with a 0 on the board and the Dodgers getting to take their hacks against a bullpen that wasn't able to contain them.

[Patrick Bateman]

That decision to pull Snell was everything wrong with sabr personified.

Pulling your ace while he is absolutely dominating after 75 pitches because he gave up a single.

“Well, you see, even though it literally lost the World Series for the Tampa Bay Rays, it was still the right decision because of ::insert blanket statement about analytics involving data on all players and any situation::. I am really smart.”

Analytics are fine, when they result in making incredibly stupid decisions like pulling Snell in that situation, they are bad.

Why was the 6th game of the World Series the time to figure out whether Snell could be capable pushed past 75 pitches, pitching the 3rd time through the order, when historically he has struggled badly in those situations, was showing a decline in velocity, and had two elite hitters coming up? The warning signs were there despite his domination up until that time, which is par for the course for him, where he is regularly dominant up until that time.

If they wanted him to be a workhorse through 75-100, 3rd time through, they should have stretched him out that way in the regular season and taken a few lumps along the way.

But that is absolutely not how he was conditioned at that point in time. This isn’t a case of closing your eyes and blindly screaming analytics.

It’s actually understanding this players skill set, and reinforcing that with proveable data, over a long period of time, and having your eyes open of the diminishing velocity warning sign that suggested the data was credible to use, in this situation.

If he was throwing the same speed in that inning, I would argue it was not reasonable to use the regular season data based on another set of performance indicators.

As much as you think I am screaming “analytics” blindly, it feels like you are just closing your eyes blindly of all types of qualitative and quantitative analysis.


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[757690]

Why was the 6th game of the World Series the time to figure out whether Snell could be capable pushed past 75 pitches, pitching the 3rd time through the order, when historically he has struggled badly in those situations, was showing a decline in velocity, and had two elite hitters coming up? The warning signs were there despite his domination up until that time, which is par for the course for him, where he is regularly dominant up until that time.

If they wanted him to be a workhorse through 75-100, 3rd time through, they should have stretched him out that way in the regular season and taken a few lumps along the way.

But that is absolutely not how he was conditioned at that point in time. This isn’t a case of closing your eyes and blindly screaming analytics.

It’s actually understanding this players skill set, and reinforcing that with proveable data, over a long period of time, and having your eyes open of the diminishing velocity warning sign that suggested the data was credible to use, in this situation.

If he was throwing the same speed in that inning, I would argue it was not reasonable to use the regular season data based on another set of performance indicators.

As much as you think I am screaming “analytics” blindly, it feels like you are just closing your eyes blindly of all types of qualitative and quantitative analysis.


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MLB postseason history is overflowing with examples of managers asking pitchers to do things they never did in the regular season. Starting on 3 games rest is the most obvious example. Closers getting 2 inning saves is another. Starters relieving and sometimes even closing games is another.

Asking a starter to go an inning farther than they usually do is a rather benign example.

[757690]

How crucial the were is debatable. The WPA value of those outs wasn't anything notable (kind of generic outs). If you feel those were the two most important outs of the game, that's an opinion I do not share.

And Cash went to his top relievers when Snell left and they gave up runs. So if Snell isn't going a full game (and he's guaranteed not doing that), those same guys come in and the Dodgers touch them up. You can make the case for going straight to Castillo, but the Dodgers got to him too earlier in the series. The best case scenario for the Rays is Snell leaving at some point with a 0 on the board and the Dodgers getting to take their hacks against a bullpen that wasn't able to contain them.

I never said they were the most important outs, just crucial outs. Clearly Cash thought they were crucial, otherwise he wouldn’t have made the move. WPA was for sure was ranking the next two batters higher than any other outs in the game up to that point. It was only the second time any Dodger was on base. The other time was in the 3rd.

[Patrick Bateman]

MLB postseason history is overflowing with examples of managers asking pitchers to do things they never did in the regular season. Starting on 3 games rest is the most obvious example. Closers getting 2 inning saves is another. Starters relieving and sometimes even closing games is another.

Asking a starter to go an inning farther than they usually do is a rather benign example.

And the stats I’ve seen on that normally indicate it’s a bad idea.


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[M2]

I never said they were the most important outs, just crucial outs. Clearly Cash thought they were crucial, otherwise he wouldn’t have made the move. WPA was for sure was ranking the next two batters higher than any other outs in the game up to that point. It was only the second time any Dodger was on base. The other time was in the 3rd.

WPA weighted the Turner out in the 6th (2nd out of the inning) identical to the 2nd out in the 5th inning and the 2nd out of the 3rd inning.

[757690]

And the stats I’ve seen on that normally indicate it’s a bad idea.


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Let’s see them then. My memory is that it’s a mixed bag. We probably remember the times it doesn’t work better, for obvious reasons.

[757690]

WPA weighted the Turner out in the 6th (2nd out of the inning) identical to the 2nd out in the 5th inning and the 2nd out of the 3rd inning.

Turner’s AB in the 6th was after the Dodgers took the lead 2-1. What was the WPA for Betts’ and Seager’s AB’s in that inning?

[PuffyPig]

MLB postseason history is overflowing with examples of managers asking pitchers to do things they never did in the regular season. Starting on 3 games rest is the most obvious example. Closers getting 2 inning saves is another. Starters relieving and sometimes even closing games is another.

Asking a starter to go an inning farther than they usually do is a rather benign example.

There is a reason why mangers don't usually ask their pitchers to do those types of things, as they usually backfire.

The ones I remember succeeding usually involve dominant pitchers like Johnson and Baumgarner, studs with a history of pitching long and hard.

Between 200-2103, there were 54 starts made on 3 days rest in the playoffs. The teams went 20-34 and the starters had a 4.80 ERA. 23 quality starts among them.

Atlanta tried it 5 times, once my Maddux, 3 times by Glavine and once my Millwood. The Braves went 0-5 in those games.

The pitchers who did win include Kershaw, Carpenter, Greinke, Pettite, Sabathia, Oswalt Beckett and Shilling.

Snell does not fall into the category.

[757690]

There is a reason why mangers don't usually ask their pitchers to do those types of things, as they usually backfire.

The ones I remember succeeding usually involve dominant pitchers like Johnson and Baumgarner, studs with a history of pitching long and hard.

Between 200-2103, there were 54 starts made on 3 days rest in the playoffs. The teams went 20-34 and the starters had a 4.80 ERA. 23 quality starts among them.

Atlanta tried it 5 times, once my Maddux, 3 times by Glavine and once my Millwood. The Braves went 0-5 in those games.

The pitchers who did win include Kershaw, Carpenter, Greinke, Pettite, Sabathia, Oswalt Beckett and Shilling.

Snell does not fall into the category.

thanks for the research. Overall it does seem that starting pitchers on 3 days rest didn’t work out that great.

However, I would absolutely include Snell in the elite pitcher group. He’s the freakin’ Cy Young award winner. I don’t know how a pitcher can be more elite that that.

A better example to compare to is having closers come in early and pitch 2 or more innings. That is what would be asked of Snell in this situation.

[PuffyPig]

thanks for the research. Overall it does seem that starting pitchers on 3 days rest didn’t work out that great.

However, I would absolutely include Snell in the elite pitcher group. He’s the freakin’ Cy Young award winner. I don’t know how a pitcher can be more elite that that.

A better example to compare to is having closers come in early and pitch 2 or more innings. That is what would be asked of Snell in this situation.

Snell has not shown the ability to pitch long into games, or at the very least he hasn’t been conditioned that way. Especially this year coming off an injury. He is likely a very bad choice to stretch when his velocity was already diminishing.

The fact that he won the CYA previously is not relevant to this discussion. No context.

How this compares to stretching out a fresh reliever for two innings is also not relevant.


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[757690]

Snell has not shown the ability to pitch long into games, or at the very least he hasn’t been conditioned that way. Especially this year coming off an injury. He is likely a very bad choice to stretch when his velocity was already diminishing.

The fact that he won the CYA previously is not relevant to this discussion. No context.

How this compares to stretching out a fresh reliever for two innings is also not relevant.


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The issue here is asking pitchers to do something in the playoffs that they were not asked to do in the regular season. I mean, if you assume Snell can’t do it because he hasn’t done it before, you are assuming the answer before asking the question. My guess is that the pitchers who were successful on 3 days rest had zero or next to zero experience doing it before.

What your research shows is that high quality pitchers are the ones who have been the most successful at doing something new, and that makes sense. That also suggests that Snell should be one of those who would succeed.

And how a reliever does when adding an inning to their role is the most relevant, because that is exactly what we are talking about asking Snell to do.

[PuffyPig]

The issue here is asking pitchers to do something in the playoffs that they were not asked to do in the regular season. I mean, if you assume Snell can’t do it because he hasn’t done it before, you are assuming the answer before asking the question. My guess is that the pitchers who were successful on 3 days rest had zero or next to zero experience doing it before.

What your research shows is that high quality pitchers are the ones who have been the most successful at doing something new, and that makes sense. That also suggests that Snell should be one of those who would succeed.

And how a reliever does when adding an inning to their role is the most relevant, because that is exactly what we are talking about asking Snell to do.

The starters who have been successful are those that are used to pitching long and hard, and even then the odds aren’t great. Look at Maddox and Glavine.

Snell is just not that type of pitcher. He so shown he is effective as long as his workload is carefully monitored. Even in his cya season he didn’t pitch long innings.

Snell is not a reliever asked to go two innings off a fresh start. It’s a complete different situation. He’s a very good starter used to pitching 5-6 innings and 75 pitches being asked to get additional innings with diminished velocity.


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[757690]

The starters who have been successful are those that are used to pitching long and hard, and even then the odds aren’t great. Look at Maddox and Glavine.

Snell is just not that type of pitcher. He so shown he is effective as long as his workload is carefully monitored. Even in his cya season he didn’t pitch long innings.

Snell is not a reliever asked to go two innings off a fresh start. It’s a complete different situation. He’s a very good starter used to pitching 5-6 innings and 75 pitches being asked to get additional innings with diminished velocity.


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What separates the starters that were successful is that they are elite, exceptionally talented. There are plenty of mediocre starters who are used long and hard (Arroyo, Leake, Simon, Feldman and other innings eaters) whose managers wouldn’t ask them to go on three days rest.

Snell is elite, exceptionally talented. I think most managers wouldn’t hesitate to ask him to go an extra inning in an elimination World Series game.

[Patrick Bateman]

The issue here is asking pitchers to do something in the playoffs that they were not asked to do in the regular season. I mean, if you assume Snell can’t do it because he hasn’t done it before, you are assuming the answer before asking the question. My guess is that the pitchers who were successful on 3 days rest had zero or next to zero experience doing it before.

What your research shows is that high quality pitchers are the ones who have been the most successful at doing something new, and that makes sense. That also suggests that Snell should be one of those who would succeed.

And how a reliever does when adding an inning to their role is the most relevant, because that is exactly what we are talking about asking Snell to do.

Those pitchers also routinely threw 200 plus innings annually and built up the endurance for it. It’s a different era, and Snell, has shown consistently based on the data after 75 pitches and 3rd time through that he becomes progressively less effective. Is it the fault of Tampa they haven’t stretched him out further, or do they know this player better than a bunch of rando internet folk that led them to be able to manage this player effectively, limiting exposure to high pitch counts, leading him to a CY young?


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