Poor Kevin Cash

[757690]

Those pitchers also routinely threw 200 plus innings annually and built up the endurance for it. It’s a different era, and Snell, has shown consistently based on the data after 75 pitches and 3rd time through that he becomes progressively less effective. Is it the fault of Tampa they haven’t stretched him out further, or do they know this player better than a bunch of rando internet folk that led them to be able to manage this player effectively, limiting exposure to high pitch counts, leading him to a CY young?


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Pitching a lot of innings doesn’t make you better prepared to go on three days rest. If it did, teams would be asking innings eaters to do it, not their top pitchers. That’s why this example isn’t a great one for the Snell situation. Those pitchers weren’t asked to go extra innings, they were asked to pitch with fewer days rest.

Anyway, this is fun being doubled teamed by father and son. Tap your dad back in, I am sure he has more good points to make

[M2]

Turner’s AB in the 6th was after the Dodgers took the lead 2-1. What was the WPA for Betts’ and Seager’s AB’s in that inning?

It's apples and barbells because various non-outs carry different weights. Yet the 2nd out of the inning would have the same relative value, especially with no one in scoring position.

[757690]

It's apples and barbells because various non-outs carry different weights. Yet the 2nd out of the inning would have the same relative value, especially with no one in scoring position.

Sorry, I misunderstood what WPA was doing. I thought it was telling us the leverage of the situation, before the event, not afterwards. The leverage before is what is interesting here, not afterwards. And again, I am betting that that Betts AB was highest leverage situation of the game up to that point.

[M2]

What separates the starters that were successful is that they are elite, exceptionally talented. There are plenty of mediocre starters who are used long and hard (Arroyo, Leake, Simon, Feldman and other innings eaters) whose managers wouldn’t ask them to go on three days rest.

Snell is elite, exceptionally talented. I think most managers wouldn’t hesitate to ask him to go an extra inning in an elimination World Series game.

Blake Snell isn't elite. He had one hot season where his innings were highly managed and his BABIP was 54 points below his career average. That was two years ago. He's perfectly fine, but his team has always shown reserve in how far it rides him.

FWIW, I'd take prime Bronson Arroyo on three days without batting an eye.

[M2]

Sorry, I misunderstood what WPA was doing. I thought it was telling us the leverage of the situation, before the event, not afterwards. The leverage before is what is interesting here, not afterwards. And again, I am betting that that Betts AB was highest leverage situation of the game up to that point.

From the pitching side, the first out of an inning generally has the highest WPA score. Getting Betts would have had a lower WPA than getting Pollock two batters earlier, though I suspect getting Seager out with runners in scoring position and less than two outs would have had a pretty high WPA value.

[757690]

Blake Snell isn't elite. He had one hot season where his innings were highly managed and his BABIP was 54 points below his career average. That was two years ago. He's perfectly fine, but his team has always shown reserve in how far it rides him.

FWIW, I'd take prime Bronson Arroyo on three days without batting an eye.

Over the last three seasons, Snell is ranked 25th in MLB in fWAR. 13th in terms of FIP.

He’s elite. The fact that you have to try to rationalize that he’s not in order to make your argument is rather telling.

[PuffyPig]

Pitching a lot of innings doesn’t make you better prepared to go on three days rest. If it did, teams would be asking innings eaters to do it, not their top pitchers. That’s why this example isn’t a great one for the Snell situation.

A teams innings eaters are generally your best pitchers. Asking an average pitcher to eat innings was a thing of the past. And a bad strategy.

And certainly pitching deep into games makes you better prepared to, gasp, pitch deep into games. Snell was ill prepared to do something he wasn’t conditioned to do, that is pitch deeper into a game with diminished velocity. He past success was likely based on just that. Even in his CYA year, he didn’t do that.


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[PuffyPig]

Over the last three seasons, Snell is ranked 25th in MLB in fWAR. 13th in terms of FIP.

He’s elite. The fact that you have to try to rationalize that he’s not in order to make your argument is rather telling.

To the extent he’s elite, it so because his innings are managed.

You seem content to ignore this very important point.

Could he have been managed differently over the past few years? Of course he could have, but he wasn’t. No different than Kramer and his levels.


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[757690]

To the extent he’s elite, it so because his innings are managed.

You seem content to ignore this very important point.

Could he have been managed differently over the past few years? Of course he could have, but he wasn’t. No different than Kramer and his levels.


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A teams innings eaters are generally your best pitchers. Asking an average pitcher to eat innings was a thing of the past. And a bad strategy.

And certainly pitching deep into games makes you better prepared to, gasp, pitch deep into games. Snell was ill prepared to do something he wasn’t conditioned to do, that is pitch deeper into a game with diminished velocity. He past success was likely based on just that. Even in his CYA year, he didn’t do that.

1. “Innings eater” is a specific expressions used to describe mid to back of the rotation starters whose main value is that they pitch deep into games. They, by definition, are not your team’s best pitchers. There are plenty of names in addition to the ones I gave that are innings eaters.
My point in bringing them up is that the ability to go deep into games doesn’t make a pitcher necessarily a good candidate to pitch on three days rest. It seems you forgot that is what we are talking about, not them being good candidates to go deep into games.

2. Again, Snell was not prepared to pitch deep into games. We get that. That is why we are discussing this. We are discussing if he still could go deep into games, even if he wasn’t prepared to do so in the regular season. We are discussing pitcher’s ability to do something that they have not been called on to do before.

3. My argument is that managers ask elite pitchers to do something new in the postseason rather regularly. Snell is an elite pitcher. It would not be unheard of, nor controversial for Cash to ask him to go deep into games for one game, one elimination game in the World Series, even though he didn’t do it all year.

4. You are taking the position that I have the most problem with, concerning how Cash managed that game. He managed it like it was a regular season game. I think that is a fault. There is an expression, “he is managing like it’s the final game of the World Series. The point of the expression is that one should manage the final game of the World Series differently than one manages a regular season game.

Do you not think that is true? Do you think a manager should manage the final game of the World Series just like it’s any other game? Because that is a view that goes against the entire history of MLB.

[kaldaniels]

The minute it’s shown that Snell’s velo dropped several ticks, taking him out as scheduled is absolutely on the table for me. Had that not happened I’d be fine with roasting Cash but so far as what “the eyes see”...well the “eyes see” a drop in velo and a grooved pitch to Barnes. Trouble was brewing.

[M2]

Over the last three seasons, Snell is ranked 25th in MLB in fWAR. 13th in terms of FIP.

He’s elite. The fact that you have to try to rationalize that he’s not in order to make your argument is rather telling.

What does my sig say about fWAR?

[JFLegal]

you guys are doing a not-so-admirable job of defending the worst decision we've been by a manager in a deciding game of the world series since ... hell, i don't even know when.

it was an amazingly-bad decision. you have your ace dominating, it's only the 6th inning, he's only thrown 73 pitches ... and you pull him after giving up a bloop hit? just atrociously bad on kevin cash's part.

[PuffyPig]

1. “Innings eater” is a specific expressions used to describe mid to back of the rotation starters whose main value is that they pitch deep into games. They, by definition, are not your team’s best pitchers. There are plenty of names in addition to the ones I gave that are innings eaters.
My point in bringing them up is that the ability to go deep into games doesn’t make a pitcher necessarily a good candidate to pitch on three days rest. It seems you forgot that is what we are talking about, not them being good candidates to go deep into games.

2. Again, Snell was not prepared to pitch deep into games. We get that. That is why we are discussing this. We are discussing if he still could go deep into games, even if he wasn’t prepared to do so in the regular season. We are discussing pitcher’s ability to do something that they have not been called on to do before.

3. My argument is that managers ask elite pitchers to do something new in the postseason rather regularly. Snell is an elite pitcher. It would not be unheard of, nor controversial for Cash to ask him to go deep into games for one game, one elimination game in the World Series, even though he didn’t do it all year.

4. You are taking the position that I have the most problem with, concerning how Cash managed that game. He managed it like it was a regular season game. I think that is a fault. There is an expression, “he is managing like it’s the final game of the World Series. The point of the expression is that one should manage the final game of the World Series differently than one manages a regular season game.

Do you not think that is true? Do you think a manager should manage the final game of the World Series just like it’s any other game? Because that is a view that goes against the entire history of MLB.

I agree that in managing the last game of the season can be done differently. But not when the odds suggest it’s not agoo choice.

For example, when you pitch a relief pitcher two games in a row, or multiple innings, he is often lost for at least two games. During the regular season, managers will often only use that relief pitcher for only a single inning to keep him available for tomorrow.

In a must win playoff game a manager will usually only live for today.

But that was not the case here. Snell was not being saved for tomorrow. The analytics and his prior usage suggested he was no longer the best choice to pitch. Or at least a risky choice.

When managers ask elite pitchers to do something different in the postseason, it’s usually a bad decision based on historic data. And when it has been successful in the minority, it’s with pitchers who are horses who are used to pitching deep into ballgames. That simply is not Snell.

Managers generally ask pitchers to do something different when they feel they have no other choice, it’s the best of a bad situation. Cash obviously felt that Snell was not the best choice and there are analytics to back up that decision.


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[757690]

I agree that in managing the last game of the season can be done differently. But not when the odds suggest it’s not agoo choice.

Managers generally ask pitchers to do something different when they feel they have no other choice, it’s the best of a bad situation. Cash obviously felt that Snell was not the best choice and there are analytics to back up that decision.

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We clearly have a fundamental disagreement, which is fine.

In the post season, you want to stick to the chart, play the odds just like it was the regular season. I want to shake things up, go off the chart, take risks, do things you would never do in the regular season. This is especially true if your are the Rays playing the Dodgers and are overmatched talent wise.

I’ll use another gambling analogy. In blackjack, if you play the odds perfectly, you will still lose in the long run, because the house has a built in advantage. The only way to win big is take risks, go against the book every now and then, and hope you get lucky.

I feel this was the Rays’ only way to beat the Dodgers. Take some risks and hope you get lucky. They aren’t beating the Dodgers playing straight by the book, strictly adhering to the plan. They needed to shake it up, go against the plan and hope they get lucky.

[Patrick Bateman]

The blackjack analogy is non sensical because there wasn’t an extreme pay off by leaving in Snell for a few batters. It’s not like if you all of a sudden go all in at the blackjack table and double your money on one hand (ie Snell getting two more outs is not worth 4 outs).

Baseball is not black jack. The best chance of winning is to consistently play the odds so as to increase your probabilities as much as you can.

It’s a 7 game series. Tampa was absolutely capable of beating them in that time period probably 40 percent of the time. Taking extreme, unsupported risks to go from 40 to 30 is a silly strategy even if it could theoretically work.


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